|Appropriations will, of course, be enacted, but when is the question. And along with bills to fund the U.S. government come policy direction.|
As Congress returns from an eventful summer recess, it is possible technology focused and related legislation is passed or advances towards passage before the body leaves Washington in late September. Yesterday, we examined the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the lapsed provisions in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Today we will look at appropriations.
Passage of regular appropriations during federal election years is almost always delayed until after the election, and the Congress and the President usually agree to extend the current year’s level of funding for agencies through late November or early December (aka a continuing resolution.) This year, negotiations over another potential pandemic package might complicate passage of a continuing resolution (CR) this month, but it appears, at present, the two issues are being handled separately with Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin having reached agreement in principle on a CR. It remains to be seen whether this agreement will hold through passage of legislation to keep the U.S. government funded as carefully negotiated deals have unraveled at the last minute when President Donald Trump found reason to object.
Also, there have been only four fiscal years since the enactment of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 in which all the appropriations bills were enacted by the beginning of the coming fiscal year. Therefore, it is almost certainly going to be the case that the current fractured political environment in Washington results in a current resolution for the first few months of FY 2021 and quite possibly well into calendar year 2021 should the Democrats take control of the White House and Senate.
Moreover, the Trump Administration has again proposed steep cuts to many civilian agencies the Congress will probably ignore based on appropriations from the previous three fiscal years appropriations process. Nonetheless, in a footnote to a summary table in its FY 2021 budget request, the Administration explained it is “propos[ing] to fund base defense programs for 2021 at the existing [Budget Control Act] cap and fund base [non-defense] programs at a level that is five percent below the 2020 [non-defense] cap.” The Administration asked that Congress “extend the [Budget Control Act] caps through 2025 at the levels included in the 2021 Budget…[which] would provide an increase in defense funding of about two percent each year, and decrease funding for [non-defense] programs by two percent (or “2-penny”) each year.”
However, the House Appropriations Committee has again rejected these deep cuts to non-defense funding and have moved forward by passing 10 of the 12 annual bills in July. By way of contrast, the Senate Appropriations Committee, has not even considered any of its bills in committee, reportedly because there was a desire to shield vulnerable Republicans running for reelection from taking tough votes on politically divisive issues. Consequently, the Senate Appropriations Committees almost certainly has bills it has worked on and are ready to go when the time comes to consider the inevitable bundling of bills either into one omnibus or smaller packages to enact FY 2021 funding.
In any event, the annual appropriations bills provide top-line funding numbers for a number of agencies with jurisdiction over United States’ technology programs and policies. There can be policy directives written into these bills usually in the form of denying the use of funds for certain purposes or tying the use of funds to an agency addressing an issue of importance to a committee or subcommittee. However, the more directive policy changes are usually written in the Committee Reports that accompany the bills.
FY 2021 Homeland Security Appropriations Act
The Homeland Security Subcommittee marked up and reported out to the full committee its “FY 2021 Homeland Security Appropriations Act” that would provide the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) with $1.844 billion for operations and support, $396 million for procurement, construction, and improvement, and $14.4 million for research & development. For FY 2020, CISA was appropriated $1.566 billion for operations and support, $434 million for procurement, construction, and improvement, and $14.4 million for research & development. For the next fiscal year, the Trump Administration requested $1.438 billion, $313 million, and $6.4 million respectively for the same categories of programs. Moreover, the Committee made available its Committee Report. However, this bill has not come to the House floor and likely will not to shield Democrats seeking reelection in moderate or right-leaning districts from facing votes on issues like immigration.
The package includes $2.6 million for a Joint Cybersecurity Coordination Group (JCCG) inside DHS “serve as a coordinating entity that will help the Department identify strategic priorities and synchronize cyber-related activities across the operational components.” This new entity comes about because the Trump Administration requested its creation as part of its FY 2021 budget request. The Committee expressed disappointment with “the lack of quality and detail provided in CISA’s fiscal year 2021 budget justification documents, to include several errors and unjustified adjustments that appear to be attributable to CISA’s premature proposal for a new Program, Project, or Activity (PPA) structure and raise questions about whether the budget could be executed as requested.” Consequently, the Committee directed that CISA “submit the fiscal year 2022 budget request at the same level of PPA detail as provided in the table at the end of this report with no further adjustments to the PPA structure.”
Among other programmatic and funding highlights, the Committee
- “[E]ncourage[d] CISA to continue to use commercial, human-led threat behavioral analysis and technology, and to employ private sector, industry-specific, threat intelligence and best practices to better characterize potential consequences to critical infrastructure sectors during a systemic cyber event.”
- Urged “CISA and the Election Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI–ISAC) to expand outreach to the most vulnerable jurisdictions” with respect to election security assistance.
- Directed “CISA to continue providing the semiannual briefing on the National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS) program and the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM)”
- Pointed to $5.8 million to set up a ‘‘central Federal information security incident center,’ a requirement mandated by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) (P.L. 113-283) and $9.3 million “to establish a formal program office to coordinate supply chain risk management efforts for federal civilian agencies; act as the executive agent for the Federal Acquisition Security Council (FASC), as authorized by the SECURE Technology Act, 2018 (Public Law 115– 390); and fund various supply chain related efforts and services.”
- Emphasized its increase of $6 million as compared to FY 2020 “to grow CISA’s threat hunting capabilities” “[i]n the face of cyber threats from nation-state adversaries such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.”
- [P]rovide[d] an increase of $11,568,000 above the request to establish a Joint Cyber Center (JCC) for National Cyber Defense to bring together federal and State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial (SLTT) governments, industry, and international partners to strategically and operationally counter nation-state cyber threats.”
- Bestowed “an increase of $10,022,000 above the request for the underlying infrastructure that enables better identification, analysis, and publication of known vulnerabilities and common attack patterns, including through the National Vulnerability Database, and to expand the coordinated responsible disclosure of vulnerabilities.”
- Noted “[t]hrough the Shared Cybersecurity Services Office (SCSO), CISA serves as the Quality Services Management Office for federal cybersecurity” and explained “[t]o help improve efforts to make strategic cybersecurity services available to federal agencies, the Committee includes $5,064,000 above the request to sustain prior year investments and an additional $5,000,000 to continue to expand the office.”
- Expressed its concern “about cyber vulnerabilities within supply chains, which pose unacceptable risks to the nation’s physical and cyber infrastructure and, therefore, to national security” and provided “an increase of $18,005,000 above the request to continue the development of capabilities to address these risks through the ICT Supply Chain Risk Management Task Force and other stakeholders, such as the FASC.”
FY 2021 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act
The FY 2021 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act has a provision that would bar either the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from taking certain actions related to Executive Order 13925, “Preventing Online Censorship” issued in May by the White House after Twitter fact checked a pair of President Donald Trump’s Tweets that contained untruthful claims about voting by mail. It is very unlikely Senate Republicans, some of whom have publicly supported this Executive Order will allow this language into the final bill funding the agencies.
Under the Executive Order, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) is to file a petition for rulemaking with the FCC to clarify the interplay between clauses of 47 USC 230, notably whether the liability shield that protects companies like Twitter and Facebook for content posted on an online platform also extends to so-called “editorial decisions,” presumably actions like Twitter’s in fact checking Trump regarding mail balloting. The NTIA would also ask the FCC to define better the conditions under which an online platform may take down content in good faith that are “deceptive, pretextual, or inconsistent with a provider’s terms of service; or taken after failing to provide adequate notice, reasoned explanation, or a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” The NTIA is also ask the FCC to promulgate any other regulations necessary to effectuate the EO. The FTC was directed consider whether online platforms are violating Section 5 of the FTC Act barring unfair or deceptive practices, which “may include practices by entities covered by section 230 that restrict speech in ways that do not align with those entities’ public representations about those practices.”
In the Committee Report for the FY 2021 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, the House Appropriations Committee explained it provided $341 million for the FTC, “a $10,000,000 increase over fiscal year 2020… will increase the FTC’s capabilities both to monitor mergers and acquisitions that could reduce competition or lead to higher prices, and to take enforcement action against companies that fail to take reasonable steps to secure their customer data or that engage in other problematic trade practices.”
The Committee detailed the following program and funding provisions related to the FTC, including combatting fraudulent calls to seniors, robocalls, fraudulent health care calls, and the following:
- Cryptocurrency.— The Committee encourages the FTC to work with the Securities and Exchange Commission, other financial regulators, consumer groups, law enforcement, and other public and private stakeholders to identify and investigate fraud related to cryptocurrencies market and discuss methods to empower and protect consumers.”
- Consumer Repair Rights.—The Committee is aware of the FTC’s ongoing review of how manufacturers—in particular mobile phone and car manufacturers—may limit repairs by consumers and repair shops, and how those limitations may increase costs, limit choice, and impact consumers’ rights under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Not later than 120 days after the enactment of this Act, the FTC is directed to provide to the Committee, and to publish online, a report on anticompetitive practices related to repair markets. The report shall provide recommendations on how to best address these problems.
- Antitrust Actions.—The Committee directs the GAO to study FTC and DOJ antitrust actions over the past 25 years. The study shall examine the following questions: How many instances have FTC and DOJ been on opposing sides of the same matter? In how many of these instances was the split created by (a) the FTC intervening in DOJ’s case; and (b) the DOJ intervening in FTC’s case? In these instances, how (if at all) did the split affect the final outcome (e.g., did the judicial opinion cite the split or explain how it affected the court’s decision)? In how many instances has an FTC action appeared before the Supreme Court? Of these instances, in how many cases did the FTC represent itself (rather than be represented by the Solicitor General)? In how many instances has the DOJ or FTC reneged on a clearance agreement with the other agency? In how many of these instances was the disruption created by (a) the FTC’s decision to renege on the agreement; and (b) the DOJ’s decision to renege on the agreement? How many amicus briefs did each agency file in each year? How many of the total amicus briefs filed by DOJ were done so at the invitation of the court? How many of the total amicus briefs filed by FTC were done so at the invitation of the court?
With respect to the FCC, the package provides $376 million and requires a host of programmatic responses, including:
- Broadband Maps.—The Committee provides significant funding for upfront costs associated with implementation of the Broadband DATA Act. The Committee anticipates funding related to the Broadband DATA Act will decline considerably in future years and expects the FCC to repurpose a significant amount of staff currently working on economic, wireline, and wireless issues to focus on broadband mapping.
- Broadband Access.—The Committee believes that deployment of broadband in rural and economically disadvantaged areas is a driver of economic development, jobs, and new educational opportunities. The Committee supports FCC efforts to judiciously allocate Universal Service Fund (USF) funds for these areas.
- Rural Digital Opportunity Fund.—The Committee appreciates the significant investment the FCC is planning to make to deploy broadband services to unserved areas. The Committee recognizes the need for government programs to minimize instances in which two different providers receive support from two different programs to serve the same location. However, the Committee is concerned that current program rules may have the unintended consequence of discouraging other funding sources from participating in broadband deployment, particularly State-based programs. The Committee directs the FCC to adjust program rules to ensure applicants, and the States in which those applicants would deploy broadband, are not put at a disadvantage when applying for the Rural Digital Opportunity Fund based on the State’s proactive, independent investment in broadband.
- Lifeline Service.—The Committee is concerned that changes to the Lifeline minimum service standards and support levels will adversely impact low-income Americans, including many suffering from economic hardships due to the coronavirus. The Committee directs the FCC to pause implementation of any changes to the currently applicable minimum service standards for Lifeline-supported mobile broadband service and any changes in the current levels of Lifeline support for voice services until the FCC has completed the State of the Lifeline Marketplace Report required by the 2016 Lifeline Order…
- Mid-Band Spectrum.—The Committee believes that Fifth-Generation (5G) mobile technology is critical to U.S. national and economic security. A key component of the U.S. strategy for 5G is ensuring that U.S. wireless providers have enough mid-band spectrum (frequencies between 3 GHz and 24 GHz), which provides fast data connections while also traveling longer distances. The Committee is concerned that the U.S. is falling behind other countries in the allocation of such spectrum. The Committee urges the Administration and the FCC to work expeditiously to identify and make available more mid-band spectrum for 5G so that the U.S. does not fall further in the race to deploy 5G networks and services.
- 5G Supply Chain.—The Committee understands the importance of a secure 5G technology supply chain. The Committee encourages the FCC to investigate options for increasing supply chain diversity, competition, and network security via interoperable technologies and open standard-based interfaces.
The Committee had a range of mandates for the Office of Management and Budget (OMB):
- Federal and Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.—The Committee is aware that Federal agencies and the nation’s critical infrastructure face unique cybersecurity threats. Executive Order 13800, issued on May 11, 2017, directs agency heads to implement several risk management and cybersecurity measures, including the National Institute of Standards and Technology Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. OMB is directed to report, within 90 days of enactment of this Act, on the status of compliance with Executive Order 13800 by each applicable agency. The report shall identify risk management and cybersecurity compliance gaps and outline the steps each agency needs to take to manage such risks. OMB shall prioritize working with the applicable agency heads to address remaining gaps and inconsistencies.
- Federal Information Technology Workforce.—OMB is directed to consult with the Office of Personnel Management and the General Services Administration and report to the Committee, no later than September 30, 2021, on gaps in Federal information technology workforce skills, disciplines, and experience required to enable the Federal government to modernize its ability to use technology and develop effective citizen-facing digital services to carry out its mission.
The Committee noted its additional funding to the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) for Election Security Grants of $500 million:
- [T]he Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) (P.L. 116–136) included $400,000,000 for grants to States to prevent, prepare for, and respond to coronavirus. The Committee is gravely concerned by persistent threats from Russia and other foreign actors attempting to influence the U.S. democratic process, and vulnerabilities that continue to exist throughout the Nation’s election system.
- Since fiscal year 2018, Congress has provided $805,000,000 in grants to States to improve the security of elections for Federal office.
- However, that funding has been inconsistent, unpredictable, and insufficient to meet the vast need across all the States and territories.
- Congress must provide a consistent, steady source of Federal funds to support State and local election officials on the frontlines of protecting U.S. elections. The bill requires States to use payments to replace direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines with voting systems that require the use of an individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballot, marked by the voter by hand or through the use of a non-tabulating ballot marking device or system, and made available for inspection and verification by the voter before the vote is cast and counted.
- Funds shall only be available to a State or local election jurisdiction for further election security improvements after a State has submitted a certification to the EAC that all DRE voting machines have been or are in the process of being replaced. Funds shall be available to States for the following activities to improve the security of elections for Federal office:
- implementing a post-election, risk-limiting audit system that provides a high level of confidence in the accuracy of the final vote tally;
- maintaining or upgrading election-related computer systems, including voter registration systems, to address cyber vulnerabilities identified through DHS scans or similar assessments of existing election systems;
- facilitating cyber and risk mitigation training for State and local election officials;
- implementing established cybersecurity best practices for election systems; and other priority activities and
- investments identified by the EAC, in consultation with DHS, to improve election security.
- The EAC shall define in the Notice of Grant Award the eligible investments and activities for which grant funds may be used by the States. The EAC shall review all proposed investments to ensure funds are used for the purposes set forth in the Notice of Grant Award.
- The bill also requires that not less than 50 percent of the payment made to a State be allocated in cash or in kind to local government entities responsible for the administration of elections for Federal office.
Regarding the General Services Administration (GSA), the Committee directed the following:
- Interagency Task Force on Health and Human Services Information Technology (IT).— The Committee urges the Chief Information Office and Chief Technology Officer (CTO) of HHS, in collaboration with the White House CTO and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), as well as the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) within HHS, 18F within the GSA, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure security Agency (CISA) within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, to establish an interagency task force that will examine existing IT infrastructure in Federal health human service programs nationwide and identify the limitations to successfully integrating and modernizing health and human services IT, and the network security necessary for health and human services IT interoperability. The task force shall submit to the Committee within 180 days of enactment on this Act a report on its progress and on recommendations for further Congressional action, which should include estimated costs for agencies to make progress on interoperability initiatives.
- Category Management.—The Committee is interested in understanding the effects of GSA’s category management policy on contracts with small businesses. Category management refers to the business practice of buying common goods and services as an enterprise to eliminate redundancies, increase efficiency, and deliver more value and savings from the Federal government’s acquisition programs. Within 180 days of the enactment of this Act, the Committee directs GSA, in cooperation with SBA, to submit a report to the Committee on the number of contracts that could have been awarded under sections 8(a), 8(m), 15(a), 15(j), 31, or 36 of the Small Business Act, but were exempted by category management since its implementation.
The Committee made the following recommendations generally:
- Cyberspace Solarium Commission Recommendations.—The Committee recognizes and supports the priorities and recommendations laid out in the Cyberspace Solarium Commission’s report and urges Federal departments and agencies to align cybersecurity budgetary priorities with those laid out by the Commission. In particular, the Committee calls attention to recommendation 3.2, Develop and Maintain Continuity of the Economy Planning; recommendation 4.6.3, Strengthen the Capacity of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, particularly with respect to the need to train Federal bankruptcy judges; recommendation 3.4, Improve and Enhance the Funding of the Election Assistance Commission; and recommendation 3.1, Strengthen Sector-specific Agencies’ Ability to Manage Critical Infrastructure Risk, particularly with respect to the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection.
- Zero Trust Model.—The Committee is aware that the most effective cybersecurity systems are based on the zero trust model, which is designed not only to prevent cyber intrusions but to prevent cyberthieves from accessing or removing protected information. To ensure that Federal agencies achieve the highest level of security against cyberattacks in the shortest amount of time, the Committee encourages all agencies to acquire and deploy zero trust cybersecurity software that is compatible with all existing operating systems and hardware platforms used by Federal agencies. The Committee also encourages Federal agencies to acquire and utilize software compatible with all existing operating systems and hardware platforms that will enable agencies to measure or quantify their risk of a cybersecurity attack in the months ahead and the types of cyberattack the agency is most likely to experience. Upon learning the risk and type of cyberattack the agency is most likely to face, the agency shall immediately take remedial action to minimize such risk. Agencies shall include information in their fiscal year 2022 Congressional Justification to Congress on their progress in complying with this directive.
FY 2021 Department of Defense Appropriations Act
On 14 July, the House Appropriations Committee marked up and reported out the “FY 2021 Department of Defense Appropriations Act,” which would provide $695 billion for the Department of Defense (DOD), “an increase of $1,294,992,000 above the fiscal year 2020 enacted level and a decrease of $3,695,880,000 below the budget request.” The House subsequently passed this bill.
The Committee Report contained these technology-related provisions:
- ZERO TRUST ARCHITECTURE. The Committee encourages the Secretary of Defense to implement a Zero Trust Architecture to increase its cybersecurity posture and enhance the Department’s ability to protect its systems and data.
- DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. The Committee is aware that distributed ledger technologies, such as blockchain, may have potentially useful applications for the Department of Defense, which include but are not limited to distributed computing, cybersecurity, logistics, and auditing. Therefore, the Committee encourages the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) to consider research and development to explore the use of distributed ledger technologies for defense applications.
- ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE PARTNERSHIPS. The Committee is aware of the United States-Singapore partnership focusing on applying artificial intelligence in support of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, which will help first responders better serve those in disaster zones. The Committee encourages the Secretary of Defense to pursue similar partnerships with additional partners in different regions, including the Middle East.
- CYBER EDUCATION COLLABORATIVES. The Committee remains concerned by widespread shortages in cybersecurity talent across both the public and private sector. In accordance with the recommendations of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, the Committee encourages the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) to direct cyber-oriented units to collaborate with local colleges and universities on research, fellowships, internships, and cooperative work experiences to expand cyber-oriented education opportunities and grow the cybersecurity workforce. The Committee also appreciates that veterans and transitioning servicemembers could serve as a valuable recruiting pool to fill gaps in the cybersecurity workforce. Accordingly, the Committee encourages the Under Secretary to prioritize collaboration with colleges and universities near military installations as well as the veteran population.
- 5G TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY. The Committee is concerned about reports that foreign manufacturers are significantly ahead of United States companies in the development and deployment of 5G telecommunications technologies, which poses a national security risk to the United States and its allies. Without a robust domestic 5G supply chain, the United States will be vulnerable to 5G systems that facilitate cyber intrusion from hostile actors. In order to secure a reliable 5G system and a domestic supply chain that meets the national security needs of the United States and its allies, the Committee encourages the Secretary of Defense to accelerate engagement with domestic industry partners that are developing 5G systems. Additionally, the Committee is aware of the significant investments being made in 5G efforts but is concerned with the level of detail provided for congressional oversight. The Committee directs the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) to conduct quarterly execution briefings with the House and Senate Appropriations Committees beginning not later than 90 days after the enactment of this Act.
- MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS. Over the past decade, the bulk of activities under Military Information Support Operations (MISO) focused on countering violent extremist organizations (VEO). While VEOs remain an ongoing threat and require continued vigilance, peer and near-peer adversaries like China and Russia are using social media and other vectors to weaken domestic and international institutions and undermine United States interests. This new information environment and the difficulty of discriminating between real and fake information heightens the importance of enhancing and coordinating United States government information-related capabilities as a tool of diplomatic and military strategy.
- The Committee recognizes the efforts and accomplishments of the United States Special Operations Command and other agencies within the executive branch to operate in the digital domain. However, it is difficult to view individual agency activities as a coordinated whole of government effort. Over the past several years, the classified annex accompanying annual Department of Defense Appropriations Acts included direction focusing on the individual activities of geographic combatant commands. However, information messaging strategies to counter Chinese and Russian malign influences cuts across these geographic boundaries and requires coordination between multiple government agencies using different authorities.
- Therefore, in order to better understand how MISO activities support a whole of government messaging strategy, the Committee directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict) to submit a report for MISO activities for the individual geographic combatant commands justified by the main pillars of the National Defense Strategy to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees not later than 15 days after submission of the fiscal year 2022 budget request and annually thereafter. The report shall include spend plans identifying the requested and enacted funding levels for both voice and internet activities and how those activities are coordinated with the Intelligence Community and the Department of State. The enacted levels will serve as the baseline for reprogramming in accordance with section 8007 of this Act. Furthermore, the Committee directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict) to submit to the congressional defense committees, not later than 90 days after the end of the fiscal year, an annual report that provides details on each combatant commands’ MISO activities by activity name, description, goal or objective, target audience, dissemination means, executed funds, and assessments of their effectiveness. Additional details for the report are included in the classified annex accompanying this Act.
FY 2021 Commerce, Justice, Science Appropriations Act
In July, the “FY 2021 Commerce, Justice, Science Appropriations Act” was also marked up and reported out, and the House passed the bill. The Committee Report contains these provisions:
- Cybersecurity Threats.—The Committee remains concerned that as the Census Bureau looks to modernize data collection methods, the Census Bureau could potentially be exploited by nefarious actors who seek to undermine the integrity of census data, which is vital to democratic institutions, and gain access to sensitive information otherwise protected by law. These threats include both hacking into the Census Bureau IT infrastructure and efforts to use supercomputing to unmask the privacy of census respondents. The Committee directs the Census Bureau to prioritize cyber protections and high standards of data differential privacy, while also maintaining the accuracy of the data, and expects the Census Bureau to update the Committee regularly on these efforts.
- Cybersecurity and Privacy.—The proliferation of data generation, storage, and usage associated with the digital economy is making it increasingly important to protect that data with effective cryptography and privacy standards. The Committee is concerned that individual, corporate, and public-sector data privacy is continuously at risk from attacks by individual actors, criminal organization, and nation-states. The Committee urges NIST to address the rapidly emerging threats in this field by furthering the development of new and needed cryptographic standards and technologies.
- National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education.—The Committee notes with concern the shortage of cybersecurity professionals across the government and private sector, from entry level applicants to experienced professionals. The Committee therefore supports the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) and directs NIST to provide resources commensurate with the prior fiscal year for this effort.
- Cybersecurity Conformity Assessment Programs.—The Committee instructs NIST, in collaboration with other relevant organizations, to report to the Committee no later than 270 days after the enactment of this Act on challenges and approaches to establishing and managing voluntary cybersecurity conformity assessment programs for information and communication technologies including federal cloud technologies.
- Cybersecurity Training.—Within the increase to Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP), the Committee directs NIST to maintain the core services of the MEP and encourages NIST to utilize existing expertise within its Information Technology Laboratory to increase cybersecurity technical training to small manufacturers to strengthen their cybersecurity capabilities given the troubling threats from state and non-state actors and other emerging threats.
- Cybersecurity threat information sharing.—The Committee supports sharing by DOJ of cybersecurity threat warnings and intelligence with private companies who may benefit from actionable information to deter, prevent, or mitigate threats. The Committee asks DOJ to provide a briefing on this topic not later than 90 days after enactment of this Act.
- Chinese-government affiliated companies.—The Committee is concerned with companies operating within the United States that are known to have substantial ties to the Chinese government, including full or partial ownership by the Chinese government, and that are required by Chinese law to assist in espionage activities, including collection of personally identifiable information of American citizens. Such companies may pose cybersecurity risks, such as vulnerabilities in their equipment, and some are the subject of ongoing Congressional and Executive Branch investigations involving their business practices. The Committee directs DOJ to enforce applicable laws and prevent the operation of known foreign entities who participate in the theft of American intellectual property, the harvesting of personal identifiable information on behalf of a foreign government, and the unlawful surveillance of American citizens by adversarial state-owned enterprises.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) would be given $1.044 billion via the “FY 2021 Commerce-Justice-Science Appropriations Act.” NIST received a total of $1.034 billion for FY 2020, and the agency requested $737 million for the next fiscal year. This bill includes annual language barring any agency receiving funds under it from buying “a high-impact or moderate-impact information system” unless all the risks have been mitigated associated with the procurement of such a system, most especially including supply chain risks, that may originate in the People’s Republic of China, Iran, North Korea, or Russia.
© Michael Kans, Michael Kans Blog and michaelkans.blog, 2019-2020. Unauthorized use and/or duplication of this material without express and written permission from this site’s author and/or owner is strictly prohibited. Excerpts and links may be used, provided that full and clear credit is given to Michael Kans, Michael Kans Blog, and michaelkans.blog with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.
Image by Francine Sreca from Pixabay